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Church and State on the Frontier: The
History of the Establishment Clauses in
the Washington State Constitution
by ROBERT F. UTTER* AND EDWARD J. LARSON**
Introduction
The Washington State Constitution touches lightly on the subject of
religion. As originally drafted by seventy-five delegates to the state con-
stitutional convention in Olympia in 1889, the document contained 254
sections, only three of which dealt with religion. The first section, the
preamble, expressed gratitude to "the Supreme Ruler of the Universe for
our liberties .... I" Another section contained a general establishment
clause and a free exercise clause.2 A third section codified a special es-
tablishment clause dealing with religion in public education.3 Except for
a minor addition regarding chaplains in state institutions4 the current
text of these three sections remains unchanged.
This Article examines the complete history of the two establishment
clauses in the Washington State Constitution--clauses that the United
States Supreme Court recently characterized as "far stricter" than the
federal Constitution's Establishment Clause.5 This historical analysis
does not suggest that the original intent of the drafters-an uncertain
concept at best-governs or controls the interpretation of those clauses
today; it merely recognizes that the history of a constitutional provision
influences future interpretations to some degree. This Article begins by
outlining the current debate over the significance of original intent in
* Justice, Washington Supreme Court; B.S., University of Washington, 1952; LL.B.,
University of Washington, 1954.
** Assistant Professor, University of Georgia; B.A., Williams College, 1974; M.A., Uni-
versity of Wisconsin, Madison, 1976; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1979; Ph.D., University of
Wisconsin, Madison, 1984.
The author wishes to thank Antonia More for her editorial assistance, and Jonathan M.
Bryant for his research assistance.
1. WASH. CONST. preamble.
2. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 11.
3. WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 4.
4. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 11.
5. Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 489 (1986).
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constitutional law. The Article then examines the federal Enabling Act,6
which authorized the drafting of the Washington Constitution. This sec-
tion focuses particular attention on the Act's request for nonsectarian
public schools in the new state. Finally, the Article discusses the draft-
ers' purposes. Of course, their intent cannot be determined with absolute
certainty. The state establishment clauses contain ambiguous terms and
abstract concepts, making their meaning unclear. Yet it is possible to
discern a general appreciation of the principles and concerns underlying
the establishment clauses. Understanding the principles and concerns
behind these clauses is invaluable when applying them to current situa-
tions that the drafters or ratifiers of the constitution could not have
foreseen.
I. The Uses of Original Intent
A. The Debate
The debate over the role of original intent in interpreting the federal
Constitution has recently spilled over from law schools and academic
journals into public speeches and the media.7 This debate demonstrates
6. Ch. 180, § 4, 25 Stat. 676-77 (1889).
7. For example, New York Governor Mario Cuomo, in an August 11, 1986, address to
the American Bar Association, observed:
That perennial argument, over whether and to what extent the precise language
of the Constitution should be molded to accommodate new realities, is again the
focus of national debate. In that debate, the two sides seem frequently driven to
extremes.
For example, it seems absurd to believe literally in the notion of "original in-
tent"; that the reach of our fundamental law should be limited to only the specific
realities known to the Founding Fathers two centuries ago. It seems obvious that
interpretation is necessary in order to keep the Constitution a workable document.
But the case isn't as easy as that, because it's outrageous to believe, on the other
hand, that the Constitution empowers the Supreme Court to design its own social
policy without having to find justification in the Constitution. As usual, the truth lies
somewhere between Scylla and Charybdis and finding the safe route can be difficult.
Governor Mario Cuomo, 10 HAMLINE L. REv. 97, 98 (1987) (emphasis in original) (partial
transcript of speech by Governor Cuomo before the 108th Annual Meeting of the American
Bar Association). The fact that original intent became the topic for Governor Cuomo's speech
and that the speech was widely publicized is evidence of the contemporary public interest in
the issue.
In 1980, several years before the appearance of the current heightened public interest,
Stanford University law professor John Hart Ely described the matter as a "long-standing
dispute in constitutional theory." J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 1 (1980) (footnotes
omitted). In 1986, before his own nomination to the United States Supreme Court made the
debate on original intent even more topical, Judge Robert H. Bork added, "This issue has been
a topic of fierce debate in the law schools for the past thirty years. The controversy shows no
sign of subsiding. To the contrary, the torrent of words is freshening." Bork, The Constitu-
tion, Original Intent, and Economic Rights, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 823, 823 (1986). Charac-
terizing the controversy as an "uproar", University of Iowa Professor H. Jefferson Powell
noted in 1987:
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the current legal significance of the principles and concerns underlying
the establishment clauses in the Washington Constitution.
The Reagan Administration's advocacy of the so-called "originalist"
position has, in part, sparked this debate.' Attorney General Edwin
Meese III, during a speech in 1985, publicly stated his views on the role
of original intent:
In the main, a jurisprudence that seeks to be faithful to our
Constitution-a jurisprudence of original intention, as I have
called it-is not difficult to describe. Where the language of the
Constitution is specific, it must be obeyed. Where there is a de-
monstrable consensus among the Framers and ratifiers as to a prin-
ciple stated or implied by the Constitution, it should be followed.
Where there is ambiguity as to the precise meaning or reach of a
constitutional provision, it should be interpreted and applied in a
manner so as to at least not contradict the text of the Constitution
itself .... 9
Much recent constitutional scholarship has revolved around the necessity and possib-
lity of originalist interpretation of the Constitution. Various members of bench, bar,
and professoriat have warned that only faithful adherence to "the original intent of
the framers" can enable courts to exercise "neither force nor will but merely judge-
ment," as is their commission. Other justices and academics have denied an obliga-
tion to follow directly the founders' extratextual intentions, and some have suggested
that, desirable or not, the endeavor is impossible.
Powell, Rules for Originalists, 73 VA. L. REv. 659, 659 (1987) (footnotes omitted).
8. See, eg., Kurland, History and the Constitution: All or Nothing at All?, 75 ILL. B.J.
262 (1987).
Professor Powell has noted:
Those who advocate giving normative force to the "original intent" of the Constitu-
tion's framers and adopters go by several names: intentionalists, originalists, interpre-
tivists. I have chosen to use "originalist" in this essay because it suggests adherence
to the Constitution's original meaning(s) in the founders' actual intentions.
Powell, supra note 7, at 659 n.1. The term "originalist" will be used in this Article.
9. Meese, Addresses-Construing the Constitution, 19 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 22, 26-27
(1985) (transcript of Meese's speech before the District of Columbia Chapter of the Federalist
Society Lawyers Division, Nov. 15, 1985). Meese delivered similar public statements during
the summer of 1985. The Administration's position is also reflected in scholarly articles writ-
ten by two people who were nominated by President Reagan for positions on the United States
Supreme Court. First, William H. Rehnquist, who was nominated by Reagan for Chief Jus-
tice, noted:
Once we have abandoned the idea that the authority of the courts to declare laws
unconstitutional is somehow tied to the language of the Constitution that the people
adopted, a judiciary exercising the power of judicial review appears in a quite differ-
ent light. Judges then are no longer the keepers of the covenant; instead they are a
small group of fortunately situated people with a roving commission to second-guess
Congress, state legislatures, and state and federal administrative officers concerning
what is best for the country.
Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEx. L. REV. 693, 698 (1976). Second,
Robert H. Bork, who was nominated by Reagan for Associate Justice, wrote:
The only way in which the Constitution can constrain judges is if judges interpret the
document's words according to the intentions of those who drafted, proposed, and
ratified its provisions and its various amendments. It is important to be plain at the
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Thus, according to the Attorney General, the Framers' original intent
should govern or at least narrowly guide all constitutional law.
United States Supreme Court Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., takes
issue with the originalist approach. He believes that "[ilt is arrogant to
pretend that from our vantage we can gauge accurately the intent of the
Framers on application of principles to specific, contemporary ques-
tions.""l He has described his own use of original intent as follows:
We current Justices read the Constitution in the only way we
can: as Twentieth Century Americans. We look to the history of
the time of framing and to the intervening history of interpretation.
But the ultimate question must be, what do the words of the text
mean in our time? For the genius of the Constitution rests not in
any static meaning it might have had in a world that is dead and
gone, but in the adaptability of its great principles to cope with
current problems and current needs.'1
Justice Brennan does not altogether reject a role for original intent in
constitutional law, but rather advocates using it as a guide to understand-
ing the principles behind the language.
The respective positions of Meese and Brennan do not represent the
full debate on the role of original intent. Many legal scholars, jurists, and
attorneys articulate completely different views. 2 The positions of Meese
outset what intentionalism means. It is not the notion that judges may apply a con-
stitutional provision only to circumstances specifically contemplated by the Framers.
In such a narrow form the philosophy is useless. Because we cannot know how the
Framers would vote on specific cases today, in a very different world from the one
they knew, no intentionalist of any sophistication employs the narrow version just
described....
[A]ll an intentionalist requires is that the text, structure, and history of the Con-
stitution provide him not with a conclusion but with a major premise. That premise
states a core value that the Framers intended to project. The intentionalist judge
must then supply the minor premise in order to protect the constitutional freedom in
circumstances the Framers could not foresee.
Bork, supra note 7, at 826.
10. Brennan, Addresses-Construing the Constitution, 19 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 2, 4 (1985)
(transcript of speech by Justice Brennan at Georgetown University, Oct. 12, 1985).
11. Id. at 7.
12. In addition to the books and articles cited supra notes 7-11, and infra notes 13-15,
recent scholarly commentary on this issue include, e.g., R. DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCI-
PLE (1985); L. TRIBE, GOD SAVE THIs HONORABLE COURT: HOW THE CHOICE OF SUPREME
COURT JUSTICES SHAPES OUR HISTORY (1985); Bennett, JudicialActivism and the Concept of
Original Intent, 69 JUDICATURE 218 (1986); Berger, New Theories of "Interpretation": The
Activist Flight from the Constitution, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1986); Clinton, Judges Must Make
Law: A Realistic Appraisal of the Judicial Function in a Democratic Society, 67 IOWA L. REV.
711 (1982); Cooke & Kende, Jurisprudence of Original Intention: A Critical Evaluation, 4
DET. C.L. REv. 1003 (1986); Lay, The Constitution, the Supreme Court, and Mr. Meese:
Habeas Corpus and the Doctrine of Original Intent, 4 DET. C.L. REV. 983 (1986); Perry, The
Authority of Text, Tradition, and Reason: A Theory of Constitutional "Interpretation" 58 S.
CAL. L. REV. 551 (1985); Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARv. L.
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and Brennan, however, establish general boundaries for the debate and
are used by courts to interpret the Constitution. Indeed, University of
Chicago law professor Philip B. Kurland argues that courts should act
within the parameters set by Meese and Brennan on this issue.13
Constitutional interpretation inevitably involves some consideration
of the intent of the Framers.14 As a practical matter, the history behind
provisions of the Constitution influences constitutional interpretation
even if it does not control it."' In recent years, the United States
Supreme Court has become deeply involved in an historical inquiry con-
REv. 885 (1985); and White, Reflections on the Role of the Supreme Court: The Contemporary
Debate and the 'Lessons' of History, 63 JUDICATURE 162 (1979).
13. In an article citing the positions of Meese and Brennan as extremes, Kurland observed
that "if you wish to speak or think about the real world and to understand the Supreme Court
as an institution of government with important functions to perform, you are not likely to find
satisfaction either as a Meesian or as a Brennanite." Kurland, supra note 8, at 262. Some
commentators have suggested that, in practice, Brennan grants a larger role to original intent
in constitutional interpretation than his theoretical comments might suggest. See, e.g., McAf-
fee, Constitutional Interpretation-The Uses and Limitations of Original Intent, 75 ILL. B.J.
263, 267 (1987).
14. Harvard Law School professor Richard H. Fallon, Jr. recently noted:
With only a few dissenters, most judges, lawyers, and commentators recognize
the relevance of at least five kinds of constitutional argument: arguments from the
plain, necessary, or historical meaning of the constitutional text; arguments about the
intent of the Framers; arguments of constitutional theory that reason from the hy-
pothesized purposes that best explain either particular constitutional provisions or
the constitutional text as a whole; arguments based on judicial precedent; and value
arguments that assert claims about justice or social policy.
Fallon, A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REv.
1189, 1189-90 (1987) (footnote omitted). See also Powell, supra note 7, at 697. In his article,
which is highly critical of the originalists' position, Professor Powell noted that historical argu-
ments based on original intent are an "inextricable part of the constitutional tradition we have
received and carry on." Id.
15. Commenting on the interpreter's role, Stanford University law professor Paul Brest
asserted:
The interpreter's task as historian can be divided into three stages or categories.
First, she must immerse herself in the world of the adopters to try to understand
constitutional concepts and values from their perspective. Second, at least the inten-
tionalist must ascertain the adopters' interpretive intent and the intended scope of the
provision in question. Third, she must often "translate" the adopters' concepts and
intentions into our time and apply them to situations that the adopters did not
foresee.
Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REv. 204, 218
(1980). Brest dismissed strict textualism as antagonistic to such intentionalism. He did, how-
ever, acknowledge a role for the "moderate textualist", whom he described as:
[One who] takes account of the open-textured quality of language and reads the lan-
guage of provisions in their social and linguistic contexts. A moderate intentionalist
applies a provision consistent with the adopters' intent ... consistent with what is
sometimes called the "purpose of the provision." Where the strict intentionalist tries
to determine the adopters' actual subjective purposes, the moderate intentionalist at-
tempts to understand what the adopters' purposes might plausibly have been, an aim
far more readily achieved than a precise understanding of the adopters' intentions.
Id. at 223 (footnotes omitted).
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cerning the federal constitutional proscription against establishment of
religion. The next section discusses this historical inquiry and its useful-
ness in constitutional interpretation.
B. The Federal Establishment Clause and Principles of Constitutional
Interpretation
Prior to 1947, the courts rarely made reference to the federal Estab-
lishment Clause. In 1947, the Supreme Court held in Everson v. Board of
Education 16 that the Clause applied to state as well as federal action
through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice
Hugo Black, writing for the majority, relied heavily on original intent to
determine whether the Establishment Clause barred New Jersey from us-
ing state tax revenue to finance parochial school transportation.17 Justice
Black discussed colonial and early national conceptions of the separation
of church and state. He concluded that the first amendment religion
clauses "had the same objective and were intended to provide the same
protection against governmental intrusion on religious liberty" as the
1787 Virginia Bill for Religious Liberty authored by Thomas Jefferson
and supported by James Madison." Black reasoned that "[i]n the words
of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law was in-
tended to erect 'a wall of separation between church and State.' 19 Since
the New Jersey law under review in Everson did not breach this wall, the
law was upheld.20
Twenty-four years later, Justice Brennan adopted a similar ap-
proach to interpreting the Establishment Clause. In a concurring opin-
ion supporting a New York law that exempted church property from
taxation,2 Justice Brennan examined the Framers' attitudes toward reli-
gious tax exemptions and concluded, "it seems clear that the exemptions
16. 330 U.S. 1 (1946).
17. At the start of his analysis, Black wrote:
Whether this New Jersey law is one respecting an "establishment of religion" re-
quires an understanding of the meaning of that language, particularly with respect to
the imposition of taxes. Once again, therefore, it is not inappropriate briefly to review
the background and environment of the period in which that constitutional language
was fashioned and adopted.
Id. at 8 (footnote omitted).
18. Id. at 13.
19. Id. at 16 (citation omitted).
20. Id. at 18.
21. Referring to an earlier ruling against school prayer, Justice Brennan wrote: "I adhere
to the view ... that to give concrete meaning to the Establishment Clause, 'the line we must
draw between the permissible and the impermissible is one which accords with history and
faithfully reflects the understanding of the Founding Fathers.'" Waltz v. Tax Comm'n, 397
U.S. 664, 680 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
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were not among the evils that the Framers and Ratifiers of the Establish-
ment Clause sought to avoid."22 Relying heavily on this historical re-
search into the Framers' attitudes, he agreed that the New York tax
exemption did not violate the federal Establishment Clause.
- Regardless of the interpretive approach courts choose to follow, the
Framers' intent often guides efforts to interpret the Establishment Clause
and other provisions of the federal Constitution. Whether or not jurists
and scholars believe that they are bound by the original purpose of a
constitutional provision, its history is a necessary starting point for
analysis.
The United States Supreme Court has relied on constitutional his-
tory to determine the meaning of the Establishment Clause; this method
of analysis provides a model for state courts to follow in exploring the
meaning of similar clauses in their state constitutions. State courts
should keep in mind, however, two fundamental differences between
state constitutions and the federal Constitution. First, the federal gov-
ernment is in theory a government of limited powers. It possesses only
those powers expressly granted to it by its Constitution.23 State govern-
ments, on the contrary, are governments of plenary power. They have
the power to act in any manner not expressly proscribed by their state
constitutions or the United States Constitution.24 Thus, while the federal
Constitution confers an affirmative grant of power, a state constitution
constrains a state's otherwise general powers. Second, a state constitu-
tion is an expression of the people's will and depends on ratification for
its validity. Under Washington law, state courts must construe the
words of the state constitution according to their common and ordinary
meaning at the time the particular provision was adopted.25 Courts must
22. Id. at 682. Brennan focused particular attention on the attitudes of Jefferson and
Madison, noting:
Thomas Jefferson was President when tax exemption was first given Washington
churches, and James Madison sat in sessions of the Virginia General Assembly that
voted exemptions for churches in that Commonwealth. I have found no record of
their personal views on the respective Acts. The absence of such a record is itself
significant. It is unlikely that two men so concerned with the separation of church
and state would have remained silent had they thought the exemptions established
religion.
Id. at 684-85.
23. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
24. Id.
25. State ex rel. O'Connell v. Slavin, 75 Wash. 2d 554, 557, 452 P.2d 943, 945 (1969);
State ex rel. Albright v. Spokane, 64 Wash. 2d 767, 770, 394 P.2d 231, 234 (1964); State vP
Brunn, 22 Wash. 2d 120, 139, 154 P.2d 826, 835 (1945), rev'don other grounds, State v. Matus-
cewski, 30 Wash. App. 714, 717, 637 P.2d 994, 996 (1981); State ex. rel. Linn v. Superior
Court, 20 Wash. 2d 138, 143, 146 P.2d 543, 546 (1944); and Utter, Presenting a State Constitu-
tional Argument: Comment on Theory and Technique, 20 IND. L. Rav. 635, 654-58 (1987).
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look to the meaning that the words would have had to the vast majority
of ordinary voters, not merely to the drafters.26 Keeping these principles
of interpretation in mind, this Article next examines the historical setting
and political debate underlying the establishment clauses of the Washing-
ton State Constitution to determine whether there was a decisive consen-
sus on their original purpose.
II. The Federal Enabling Act of 1889
The delegates to the Washington Constitutional Convention in
1889, and the territorial electorate that ratified their work, had to con-
tend with some restrictions imposed by the Federal Enabling Act, which
authorized the Convention as a step toward statehood. There was one
particularly significant limitation in the area of religious freedom. The
Enabling Act required that the convention include a provision for "the
establishment and maintenance of a system of public schools, which shall
be open to all children.., and free from sectarian control."'2
The Convention addressed this matter by drafting article IX, section
4 of the state constitution: "All schools maintained or supported wholly
or in part by the public funds shall be forever free from sectarian control
or influence."28 The language of this provision, which constitutes a spe-
cial establishment clause dealing with religion in public education, is suf-
ficiently similar to the public school provision of the Enabling Act to link
the two. Thus, in order to determine the intent behind the state provi-
sion, it is helpful to examine the intent behind the federal provision.
The Enabling Act has a long and tortuous legislative history that
stretches over several Congresses and is mired in partisan politics. Parti-
san politics created an especially deep mire at the time. The Enabling
See also B.F. Sturtevant Co. v. O'Brien, 186 Wis. 10, 19, 202 N.W. 324, 327 (1925) (words of
state constitution must be construed in the context of the "general run of voters to whom they
were submitted").
The malleable character of the English language suggests that the meaning of words in a
constitutional provision is not always clear even with words that may be familiar to us. The
usage and connotations of words changes over time, and it is important to evaluate the context
in which the words are used. Therefore, in trying to determine the intent of the people who
ratified the state constitution, "the public history of the times should be consulted and have
weight .... ." State ex rel. Mason County Logging Co. v. Wiley, 177 Wash. 65, 74, 31 P.2d
539, 543 (1934).
26. State ex rel. Albright, 64 Wash. 2d at 770, 394 P.2d at 233.
27. Enabling Act, ch. 180, § 4, 25 Stat. 676-77 (1889). This restriction was to be enforced
by an ordinance revocable only with the consent of both the federal government and the people
of Washington, making it more difficult to change than a state constitutional provision. Arti-
cle XXIII of the Washington State Constitution included such an ordinance; article IX, § 4 of
the state constitution specifically addresses this issue.
28. WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 4.
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Act was signed into law by Democratic President Grover Cleveland just
days before he was to be succeeded by Republican Benjamin Harrison.
Harrison won an electoral college victory over Cleveland, although
Cleveland had received a majority of the popular vote.29 The Congress
that passed the Enabling Act was also split. Both the Democratic and
Republican Parties claimed popular support and political power; Repub-
licans controlled the Senate, and Democrats controlled the House of
Representatives. 0 This division affected consideration of the Enabling
Act because, under the Act, Congress would authorize the admission of
new states that would change the precarious partisan balance in Congress
and the Electoral College. The addition of any new state could signifi-
cantly influence national politics, therefore both parties stood firm in
blocking the admission of states likely to support the opposition. 31
A. The Senate and Senate Bill 185
The Congress reached a compromise in Senate Bill 185 (S. 185).32
When S. 185 passed the Republican-controlled Senate in 1888, it pro-
vided for the admission of only the Republican-dominated southern part
of the Dakota territory. Although the Bill set aside federal land to sup-
port education, it neither mandated a system of public schools nor ad-
dressed the issue of sectarian control over education. 3 Democratic
Senator M.C. Butler of South Carolina unsuccessfully offered an alterna-
tive version of S. 185, which would have authorized all of the Dakota
Territory to enter the union as one state.34 This alternative contained the
public school provision, but Butler struck this provision on his own mo-
tion prior to floor debate. Butler's reason for dropping the provision was
that he had "no doubt the State [would] provide for a system of common
schools, but [did] not believe that the Congress of the United States ha[d]
anything to do with the question."35 The Senators said nothing further
about the public school issue during the debate, and Butler's alternative
lost.
29. Cleveland rebounded to defeat Harrison in the 1892 presidential election. Numerous
books and articles analyze voting behavior in this era of American political history. See, ag.,
W. BURNHAM, CRrrIcAL ELECTIONS AND THE MAINSPRINGS OF AMERICAN POLITICS
(1970).
30. CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY'S GUIDE TO U.S. ELECTIONS 1124 (1985).
31. See, H. SCHELL, HISTORY OF SouTH DAKOTA 212-22 (1961).
32. S. 185, 50th Cong., 1st Sess. (1887).
33. Id.
34. 19 CONG. REc. 2831 (1888). M.C. Butler was the ranking or senior Democratic
member of the Senate Committee on Territories at this time. 19 CONG. REc. 16 (1887).
35. Id.
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B. The House and House Bill 8566
Meanwhile, the Democrat-dominated House was passing its own
quite different statehood legislation in 1888. Led by Chairman William
M. Springer,3 6 the House Committee on the Territories merged four sep-
arate bills into House Bill 8566 (H.R. 8566)."7 This proposal authorized
the admission of the Dakota Territory as one state, to be offset by the
admission of three potentially Democratic states: Montana, New Mex-
ico, and Washington.38 H.R. 8566, however, contained the public school
provision. As for this restriction on the state constitutional conventions,
the Committee Report accompanying H.R. 8566 simply stated, "Other
provisions usual in enabling acts are required, especially that ... provi-
sion shall be made for the establishment and maintenance of systems of
public schools, which shall be open to all the children of ... States and
free from sectarian control."39 This statement is deceiving. The public
school provision was not "usual." The Colorado enabling act immedi-
ately preceding it had contained no such provision;' neither had any of
the eleven unsuccessful statehood bills introduced in the previous Con-
gress (1885-1887), including the three sponsored by Springer himself.4
Indeed, the earliest proposed enabling act in which such language can be
found was a bill introduced by Springer on January 4, 1888, to admit the
Dakota Territory as a single state.42
A crucial step in breaking the stalemate on the admission of new
states occurred early in 1889 when the House grafted the language of
H.R. 8566 onto the Senate-passed S. 185 and allowed splitting of the
36. (13.4n1.).
37. 19 CONG. REC. 3002 (1888).
38. Id.
39. H.R. Rep. No. 1025, 50th Cong., Ist Sess. 2 (1888).
40. See Enabling Act, ch. 139, § 4, 18 Stat. 474-75 (1875).
41. The 11 unsuccessful statehood bills are the following: S. 40, 49th" Cong., 1st Sess.
(1885); S. 67, 49th Cong., 1st Sess. (1885); S. 578, 49th Cong., Ist Sess. (1885); S. 967, 49th
Cong., Ist Sess. (1886); S. 1138, 49th Cong., Ist Sess. (1886); H.R. 2820, 49th Cong., Ist Sess.
(1886); H.R. 4363, 49th Cong., 1st Sess. (1886); H.R. 5518, 49th Cong. 1st Sess. (1886); H.R.
7376, 49th Cong., 1st Sess. (1886); H.R. 8120, 49th Cong., 1st Sess. (1886); and H.R. 10,225,
49th Cong., 2d Sess. (1886). Springer sponsored H.R. 5518, H.R. 8120, H.R.10,225.
42. H.R. 1276, 50th Cong., Ist Sess. § 5 (1888). Three weeks after Springer offered this
bill in the House, Senator Butler offered the same text as a minority Democratic alternative to
S. 185 in the Senate. But, at his first opportunity, Butler singled out the public school provi-
sion for deletion, even though his overall alternative was doomed to defeat. S. 185, 50th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 6 (Butler Substitute, Jan. 25, 1888). See also 19 CONG. REc. 2132-2831
(1888). Since both sponsors were Democrats, it is not surprising that Butler borrowed
Springer's bill as a readily available alternative to the majority Republican version of S. 185.
Butler may not have known that H.R. 1276 contained a public school provision when he
borrowed it. He certainly did not want that provision to remain in his bill. See infra note 67.
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Dakota Territory into two states.4 3 The two versions of S. 185 went
before a conference committee; the final compromise retained the House
language, but deleted New Mexico from the bill.' As a result, the En-
abling Act covered four states: Washington, Montana, and North and
South Dakota, but those states were subject to a variety of restrictions
from H.R. 8566, including the public school provision. Perhaps because
that provision appeared only in the last version of S. 185 and had been
casually dismissed as a "usual provision" in H.R. 8566,15 there was little
discussion of it during final congressional action on the Conference
Report.
C. Senator William W. Blair
Only Senator Willaim W. Blair, Chairman of the Senate Education
Committee, mentioned the public school provision. But Blair did so in
such a way as to link the provision to a long-standing congressional and
public controversy.46 During a Senate floor debate, Blair referred to a
proposed federal constitutional amendment that he had introduced in the
Senate seven months earlier.47 That proposal would have extended the
first amendment religion clauses to the states, required each state to pro-
vide free public schools, prohibited state support for parochial schools,
and barred sectarian instruction in public schools.48
For Blair, the concept of sectarian instruction had a precise mean-
ing. This meaning was apparent in the proposed amendment which,
while barring sectarian instruction, would have required the free public
schools to educate children "in virtue, morality, and the principles of the
Christian religion."49 Blair believed that an education in religious princi-
ples was necessary. For him these principles made up the "very fabric of
43. 20 CONG. REC. 806-08 (1889).
44. 20 CONG. REC. 2096 (1889). Of the five states being considered for admission, only
New Mexico was solidly Democratic, while Montana and Washington were mixed, and the
Dakotas were solidly Republican. By early 1889, however, Democrats in Congress had lost
much of their bargaining power because Republicans won the 1888 election and soon would
take control of both the presidency and the House of Representatives while retaining the Sen-
ate. CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY'S GUIDE TO U.S. ELECTIONS 1124 (1985).
45. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
46. See infra notes 53-58 and accompanying text.
47. 20 CONG. REC. 2100 (1889). Blair described the public school provision as "the sub-
stance of a constitutional amendment now pending before the body designed to secure the
same in substance to the people of all the States." Id. No member of Congress objected to or
disagreed with Blair's comments on this issue during the congressional debate on S. 185. At
the time, the First Amendment of the United States Constitution did not apply to actions by
the states.
48. S. 86, 50th Cong., Ist Sess. (1888).
49. Id. § 2.
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society ... [and formed] the basis of our customs and laws. . .. "I'
Blair clearly did not intend the public school provision of the En-
abling Act to prohibit instruction on religious principles. He believed
that this instruction did not constitute promotion of sectarian religion.
Quite to the contrary, he intended that the Act would advance the teach-
ing of Christian principles without advancing sectarianism."' Support of
the Enabling Act's public school provision and Blair's proposed constitu-
tional amendment indicates that Blair favored the common school 2 over
the parochial school.
D. Appeal for a Constitutional Amendment
The issue did not begin or end with Blair. On the national level, the
issue was prominently raised for the first time by President Ulysses S.
Grant in a speech to a veterans' convention in 1875. After asserting that
better education was vital to the promotion of prosperity and political
freedom, Grant declared "[e]ncourage free schools, and resolve that ....
neither the State or Nation, nor both combined, shall support institutions
of learning, other than those sufficient to afford to every child growing up
in the land the opportunity of a good common school education, un-
mixed with sectarian, pagan, or atheistical dogmas."53
50. 20 CONG. REC. 434 (1888).
51. In support of the Enabling Act's public school provision, Blair read from a petition
signed by "a large number of the leading citizens of the city of Philadelphia." The petition
stated:
Two grave dangers threaten at this hour the American system of common schools,
the atheistic tendency in education and the strenuous demand for a division of the
school funds in the interest of sectarian or denominational schools. Through the
former tendency the reading of the Christian Scriptures and the offering of prayer
have been forbidden in the schools of some of our principal cities, while one at least
has gone so far as to throw out of her schools every text-book containing any refer-
ence to God. This attempt to exclude all religious ideas from the instruction given in
the public schools we hold to be both unphilosophical and inimical to the public
good, because it neglects the moral faculties, which are the most important faculties
of man, and the right exercise of which is most important to the State; and because it
does not correspond to the character of the institutions for which the common school
is designed to prepare the citizens of this Republic.
20 CONG. Rnc. 2100 (1889). The original petition is retained in the limited records of the
Senate Committee on Education and Labor, 50th Congress, at the National Archives, Wash-
ington, D.C.
52. The common school is typically defined as a public elementary school. E.g., AMERI-
CAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 269 (1975). It is open to all local
school-age children, regardless of their religious beliefs. In his floor statement supporting the
public school provision, Blair asserted, "All over the country our people are learning that a
great question has arisen. It is this: Which shall be the survivor, the common school or the
parochial, the denominational school in this country?" 20 CONG. REc. 2100 (1889).
53. N.Y. Tribune, Oct. 1, 1875, at 1, col. 4 (text of Grant's speech to Army of Tennessee).
The decisive role this speech played in catapulting concern over nonsectarian public schools to
a national issue is discussed in C. MOEHLMAN, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS AND RELI-
The influential Republican Congressman James G. Blaine54 intro-
duced a constitutional amendment to this end in the House of Represent-
atives later in 1875. 55 The amendment provided that no state would
support religion, but also stated that it should not be construed to restrict
Bible reading in school.56 Despite acrimonious debate, the "Blaine
GION 16-17 (1938); L. PFEFFER, CHURCH STATE AND FREEDOM 533-34 (1967); and 2 A.
STOKES, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 68 (1950). Three months later, Grant
included similar observations in a message to Congress, and recommended adoption of a fed-
eral constitutional amendment to enforce this resolve on the states. 4 CONG. REC. 175 (1875).
With respect to a constitutional amendment, Grant stated as follows:
I suggest for your earnest consideration ... that a constitutional amendment...
making it the duty of each of the several States to establish and forever maintain free
public schools adequate to the education of all the children in the rudimentary
branches within their respective limits, irrespective of sex, color, birthplace, or reli-
gions; forbidding the teaching in said schools of religious, atheistic, or pagan tenets;
and prohibiting the granting of any school funds, or school taxes, or any part thereof,
either by legislative, municipal, or other authority for the benefit or in aid, directly or
indirectly, of any religious sect or denomination, or in aid or for the benefit of any
other object of any nature or kind whatever.
Id. The Republican National Party endorsed this proposal in its 1876 platform. A. STOKES &
L. PFEFFER, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 272 (1964); and Klinkhamer, The
Blaine Amendment of 1875: Private Motives for Political Action, 42 CATH. HiST. REV. 15, 37-
38 (1956). Grant's successor, Republican President Rutherford B. Hayes, endorsed the propo-
sal in his first message to Congress in 1877. Id. at 49.
54. (R.-Me.). Blaine was the acknowledged Republican leader in the House, and had
served as Speaker of the House from 1869 to 1875, when Democrats took control of that body.
He ran unsuccessfully for President in 1876, 1880, 1884, and 1892, securing the Republican
nomination for that office once, in 1884. He was elected to the Senate in 1876, and served as
the Secretary of State in 1881 and from 1889 to 1892. BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE
AMERICAN CONGRESS 1774-1971, at 599 (1971); CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY GUIDE TO
U.S. ELECTIONS 54, 57, 59, 62, 63, (1985).
55. 4 CONG. REC. 205 (1875). Even before Grant formally called for a constitutional
amendment prohibiting the use of state school funds for sectarian schools, Blaine had favored
an amendment extending the Establishment Clause to cover state as well as federal action and
expanding the scope of the restriction so that "all possibility of hurtful agitation on the school
question should be ended also." C. BALESTIER, JAMES G. BLAINE: A SKETCH OF HIS LIFE
58 (1884) (quoting letter from Blaine to an unnamed Ohio politician) (Oct. 20, 1875). In this
sense, the Blaine Amendment was intended to be stricter (or at least more specific) with re-
spect to state action on religion in public education than the federal Establishment Clause was
with respect to federal action in that sphere.
56. In its final Senate form, that amendment provided as follows:
No State shall make any law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof; and no religious test shall ever be required as a qualification
to any office or public trust under any State. No public property, and no public
revenue of, nor any loan or credit by or under the authority of, the United States, or
any State, Territory, District, or municipal corporation, shall be appropriated to, or
made to be used for, the support of any religious or antireligious sect, organization,
or denomination or to promote its interests or tenets. This article shall not be con-
strued to prohibit the reading of the Bible in any school or institution; and it shall not
have the effect to impair the rights of property already vested. Congress shall have
power to appropriate legislation to provide for the prevention and punishment of
violations of this article.
C. MOEHLMAN, supra note 53, at 17.
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Amendment" passed the House-in 1876 by a vote of 180 to 7, and fell
only two votes short of the two-thirds majority required for passage in
the Senate.57 Blaine continued to support an amendment during the re-
mainder of his long political career. After Blaine left Congress, Blair
took up the cause by introducing the proposal during the 1880s and
1890s. The proposal was never successful.58
E. Movement for Nonsectarian Schools
The acrimony that dogged and ultimately defeated the Blaine
Amendment stemmed from its nativistic undertones. A common school
movement had been growing at the local and state levels in many parts of
the country for at least half a century before the introduction of the
Blaine Amendment. In part, this movement supported free public educa-
tion to assimilate the increasingly diverse immigrant groups then enter-
ing the United States in steadily multiplying numbers.5 9 To achieve this
objective, the states and local government moved away from sectarian
instruction and toward the teaching of core community values, typically
explicitly Christian and implicitly Protestant.' Many Roman Catholics,
especially Irish immigrants protective of their religious and ethnic tradi-
tions, found the resulting common schools unacceptable. Some sought a
share of public education funds to support their own schools."' Many
common school advocates resisted these efforts, leading many states in
the mid- 1 800s to adopt legal and constitutional restrictions against both
the use of public funds for sectarian schools and the sectarian control of
public schools.62 President Grant and Representative Blaine led the na-
tional government's foray into this controversy by advocating a federal
57. See 4 CONG. REc. 5191 (1876) (98 congressmen, mostly Democrats, voted present,
rather than for or against the proposal, but first-term Democratic Rep. William M. Springer
voted for it); and 4 CONG. Ruc. 5595 (1876) (Senate vote was 28 for, 16 against, and 27 not
voting).
58. Klinkhamer, supra note 53, at 39 n.63, 49.
59. A. STOKES & L. PFEFFER, supra note 53, at 271-73.
60. Id., at 264-68, 272.
61. See 2 A. STOKES, supra note 53, at 57-58.
62. The history of the common school movement in the 1800s and Roman Catholic oppo-
sition to that movement is discussed in 2 A. STOKES, supra note 53, at 47-70. One of the most
prominent early leaders of this movement was Horace Mann, secretary of the Massachusetts
Board of Education from 1837 to 1849. Mann firmly opposed sectarian instruction in the
common school, but distinguished such instruction from religious education. He summarized
his views on this point in his final annual report to the Board of Education in 1848:
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constitutional amendment limiting state support of sectarian education.6"
Nativistic appeals and accusations marked the congressional debate
over the Blaine Amendment. For example, while the original amend-
ment was still pending in the House, opponent Representative S.S. Cox"
decried "a sinister sentiment of religious bigotry"6 behind the proposal,
while supporter Representative Henry W. Blair66 denounced Roman
Catholic efforts to undermine the common school movement. 67 In the
Senate, Frederick T. Frelinghuysen,68 a leading member of the commit-
tee that drafted the Senate version of the Amendment, assured members
that the proposal would not prevent teaching that "pure and undefiled
religion which appertains to the relationship and responsibility of man to
God, and is readily distinguishable from the creeds of sects."69 Accord-
ing to Frelinghuysen, that pure religion, "which is our history" and
I believed... that sectarian books and sectarian instruction, if their encroach-
ment were not resisted, would prove the overthrow of the schools.
I believed ... that religious instruction in our schools, to the extent which the
Constitution and the laws of the State allowed and prescribed, was indispensable to
their highest welfare, and essential to the vitality of moral education....
Our system earnestly inculcates all Christian morals; it founds its morals on the
basis of religion; it welcomes the religion of the Bible, and in receiving the Bible, it
allows it to do what it is allowed to do in no other system, to speak for itself.
Id. at 57.
The movement for nonsectarian common schools arose during the 1830s and 1840s in the
Northeast, just as that area was receiving the first major wave of Roman Catholic immigration
to America. Roman Catholic immigration continued to increase and spread to other areas of
the country during succeeding decades. See W. GARRISON, CATHOLICISM AND THE AMERI-
CAN MIND 97 (1928) (table of U.S. Catholic and immigrant population).
Roman Catholic leaders still opposed the common school movement, or at least hoped for
a share of the common school fund for their parochial schools, both when the Blaine Amend-
ment was first proposed and when the Enabling Act for Washington State was enacted. See,
e.g., 4 CONG. REc. 5455 (1876) (explanation by Blaine Amendment opponent Sen. Theodore
F. Randolph (D.-N.J.) of the reasons for Catholic concern regarding that Amendment); N.Y.
Times, Nov. 16, 1888, at 4, col. 3 (reporting Bishop Chatard of Indiana making "a bold and
positive demand for public funds to be used for the support of Roman Catholic parochial
schools").
63. See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
64. (D.-N.Y.)
65. 4 CONG. RIc. 180 (1876).
66. (R.-N.H.). Blair was later to become a United States Senator.
67. 4 CONG. REc. 243 app. (1876). Blair accused Southern Democratic political leaders
of opposing the spread of common schools to their region as a means to retain power. He
claimed that Roman Catholics exploited this situation by opening schools in the South,
thereby spreading their doctrines. Blair stressed that although he favored common schools, a
Roman Catholic school education was better than none. This suggestion of Southern and/or
Democratic opposition to the common school movement may have been reflected in Senator
Butler's deletion of the public school provision from his version of S. 185 in 1888. See supra
note 42.
68. (R.-N.J.)
69. 4 CONG. REc. 5562 (1876).
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should be taught in public schools, "is a very, very different thing from
the particular creeds or tenets of either religionists or infidels." 7 With-
out expressly identifying any wrongful sectarian instruction, the ensuing
debate repeatedly focused on the divisiveness of separate schools for Ro-
man Catholics.7" Thus, the ongoing debate controlled the discussion of a
national amendment for nonsectarian schools.
Although later incarnations of the Blaine Amendment did not re-
ceive as much public attention or political support, their basic intent to
prohibit sectarian instruction remained unchanged.72 The original intent
70. Id. Expanding on this distinction between religious and sectarian instruction, Freling-
huysen said, "Let me say that the saving clause in favor of the Bible is just, because it is a
religious and not a sectarian book." Id. After leaving the Senate and serving as the United
States Secretary of State, Frelinghuysen became president of the American Bible Society. BIo-
GRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE AMERICAN CONGRESS 1774-1971, at 971 (1971).
71. 4 CONG. REc. 5580-95 (1876). Special concern focused on American Roman
Catholics' loyalty to the Pope. A Catholic view of this debate is provided by Klinkhamer,
supra note 53. Charges of anti-Catholicism dogged Blaine during the remainder of his political
career and may have cost him the 1884 presidential election. In the final days of the campaign,
he failed to repudiate promptly a supporter's characterization of the opposition party as sup-
porting "Rum, Romanism and Rebellion." N.Y. Times, Nov. 2, 1884, at 1, col. 5; id. at 8,
cols. 3-4; Farrelly, "Rum, Romanism and Rebellion" Resurrected, 8 W. POLITICAL Q. 262,
262-70 (1955). Shortly after Blaine introduced the original Blaine Amendment, a Roman
Catholic cousin, Ellen E. Sherman (wife of General William T. Sherman), warned Blaine,
"Your demonstration regarding the State Constitutions and school laws will play sad havoc
with your interests among our Irish friends and Catholics." G. HAMILTON, BIOGRAPHY OF
JAMES G. BLAINE 382 (1895).
72. This is demonstrably true of the 1888 proposal, which Blair equated with the Enabling
Act's public school provision. Blair supported this proposal with petitions circulated in Prot-
estant churches advocating the public school teaching of general Christian principles without
sectarianism. The largest group of petitions came from the Boston area, which was then em-
broiled in a heated controversy ignited by the Democratic-dominated (and therefore Catholic-
and immigrant-leaning) Boston school committee's removal of an allegedly anti-Catholic his-
tory textbook from the public schools. The Protestant-backed Boston Evangelical Alliance
responded in a public campaign with a three-fold thrust: it protested the school committee's
action as reflecting wrongful sectarian control or influence over public education; it supported
public school instruction in nonsectarian Christian principles; and it called for all students to
attend either public or state-supervised private schools. Blair must have known of this nation-
ally publicized controversy when he submitted the Boston petitions in support of the amend-
ment and referred to similar petitions as supporting the Enabling Act's public school
provision. See, e.g., 20 CONG. REc. 433 (1888); 20 CONG. REC. 2100-01 (1889); N.Y. Times,
July 13, 1888, at 1, col. 4; id., Sept. 11, 1888, at 1, col. 5; id., Oct. 10, 1888, at 3, col. 5. When
the school committee refused to reintroduce the controversial textbook, protesters organized a
voter-registration drive and election campaign that elected a Republican-dominated school
committee in the next election. This drive focused on Protestant women, who registered to
vote in large numbers for the first time. At the time, women in Massachusetts could only vote
for the school committee. This voter registration drive was not matched by the other side in
the dispute, and Roman Catholic religious leaders actively discouraged women from voting.
N.Y. Times, Sept. 23, 1888, at 4, col. 7; id., Dec. 12, 1888, at 1, col. 7; id., Sept. 26, 1888, at 2,
col. 1; id., Oct. 2, 1888 at 5, col. 2; id., Dec. 12, 1888, at 1, col. 7; and id., Dec. 13, 1888, at 1,
col. 7. Blair also cited the dangers of Mormon sectarian education in Utah in support of his
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of the Blaine Amendment, including Blair's 1888 version of that amend-
ment, and Blair's understanding of the Enabling Act's public school pro-
vision is clear from this historical context. Common schools teaching
core community values (including instruction about general Christian
principles) were to be encouraged, and divisive sectarian education dis-
couraged. The visibility of the common school issue on the local and
national level, both before and during consideration of the Enabling Act,
further suggests that this issue influenced the Act's public school provi-
sion. On this less than clean slate, the delegates to the Washington State
Constitutional Convention would begin to write the state constitution's
establishment clauses.
III. State Establishment Clauses
The Enabling Act's public school provision provides a frame of ref-
erence for understanding the intent behind the state constitution's estab-
lishment clauses.7 3 The people of Washington who ratified the 1889 state
constitution and the delegates who wrote it were Americans, most of
whom had come from other parts of the country.7 4 The delegates to the
Washington Constitutional Convention came from educational and so-
cial backgrounds similar to those of the congressmen who had debated
state establishment of religion on the national level.7 5 Evidence from the
Convention and elsewhere suggests that the delegates to the Washington
Convention shared the same general goals, values, and understandings
proposed constitutional amendment, but does not identify those dangers. 20 CONG. REc. 433-
34 (1888).
73. Because the Washington State Constitution was designed as an expression of the peo-
ple's will, any analysis of its provisions must focus on the intent of those who ratified it. Of
course, evidence of the drafters' intent is also crucial. It is often the best evidence of the
people's understanding; the people elected the drafters as representatives. See Utter, Freedom
and Diversity in a Federal System: Perspectives on State Constitutions and the Washington Dec-
laration of Rights, 7 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 491, 518-21 (1984).
74. See infra note 75.
75. The Amercian Academy of Political and Social Science concluded:
(a) That nearly all the members of the conventions were from States immediately
east of the new States; (b) that the members were all fairly well educated, and that
many of them had pursued courses of study in institutions of learning widely famed;
(c) that a large number of the delegates had received legal training, and many had
held important legal offices; . . . (d) that ... many of the delegates had belonged at
one time to legislatures in the Eastern states; (e) That the members represented in
their various occupations the principal interests of modem society, and particularly
the interests of their own Territory; (f) that the majority of the delegates were young
men, less than forty years of age; (g) that none of them, except one delegate to the
Washington Convention, were natives of the Territory for which they were forming a
State constitution; and not of least importance[,]... the conventions were composed
of men who had been highly successful in life.
Thorpe, Recent Constitution-Making in the United States, 2 ANNALS 152 (1891).
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regarding the establishment of religion, as reflected in the congressional
debate on the Blaine Amendment and the public school provision.76
More importantly, a similar original intent and purpose is evident in the
debates on the Washington establishment clauses and the Blaine
Amendment. 77
The language of the state constitution's establishment clauses is sim-
ilar to that found in the Blaine Amendment. The constitution's general
establishment clause provides:
No public money or property shall be appropriated for, or applied
to any religious worship, exercise or instruction, or the support of
any religious establishment. No religious qualification shall be re-
quired for any public office, or employment, nor shall any person
be incompetent as a witness, or juror, in consequence of his opinion
on matters of religion, nor be questioned in any court of justice
touching his religious belief to affect the weight of his testimony.78
The document's special establishment clause for public education adds:
"All schools maintained or supported wholly or in part by the public
funds shall be forever free from sectarian control and influence."'79
Taken together, these clauses address state support for religious activi-
ties, secular control or influence over public schools, and religious qualifi-
cations for public office. These are the same three issues that the Blaine
Amendment addressed. 80
A. Analogy to the Blaine Amendment and Enabling Act Debates
The adoption of these clauses was no surprise given the partisan
makeup of the delegation. A comfortable majority of Republicans was
elected to the Washington Constitutional Convention in 1889.81 In all
likelihood, these new members were Blaine Republicans. At the time,
the Republican Party was split into three factions, with Blaine leading
one of them. 2 The Washington territorial delegations to the Republican
National Conventions in 1876, 1880, and 1884 had solidly backed Blaine
for President, and the state delegation to the 1892 Republican National
Convention would again back Blaine over incumbent Republican Benja-
76. See supra notes 46-72 and accompanying text.
77. See infra notes 78 - 138 and accompanying text.
78. WASH. CONsT. art. I, § 11 (1889, amended 1958). Compare text of Blaine Amend-
ment, supra note 56.
79. WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 4.
80. For the text of the Blaine Amendment, see supra note 56.
81. Thorpe, supra note 75, at 151-52; W. Airey, A History of the Constitution and Gov-
ernment of Washington Territory 441-42 (1945) (unpublished thesis available in the University
of Washington library). The delegates included 43 Republicans, 29 Democrats, 2 Labor Party
members, and 2 independents. Id.
82. CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY'S GUIDE TO U.S. ELECTIONS 54, 59 (1985).
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min Harrison.8" The Washington State Republicans also supported
Blaine's well-known and long-standing views on religious establishment
and common schools.
At the Constitutional Convention, discussion of the relationship of
the new state government to religion was reminiscent of the congres-
sional debate on the Blaine Amendment and Blair's comments on the
Enabling Act's public school provision. 4 Delegates discussed this gen-
eral topic in some form on four separate occasions. Although no tran-
script of the debate exists, newspaper accounts provide a clear picture of
events. 85
B. Discussion of Religion and the Washington Constitution
1. God in the Preamble
The most extensive and revealing convention discussion involved
the constitution's preamble. The Committee on the Preamble and Bill of
Rights proposed that the preamble read: "We, the people of the State of
Washington, to preserve our rights, do ordain this constitution."86 When
the proposal came before the entire convention on July 29, it precipitated
a serious and prolonged debate. Three delegates promptly introduced
amendments to recognize God in the preamble.8 7
First, Republican attorney Trusten P. Dyer of Seattle proposed in-
serting an expression of the people's gratitude "to Almighty God for the
83. N.Y. Times, June 21, 1876, at 2, col. I (both Washington delegates voted for Blaine on
all seven ballots); id., June 8, 1880, at 1, col. 4 (both Washington delegates voted for Blaine on
all 17 ballots); id., June 10, 1880, at 1, col. 4 (both Washington delegates stuck with Blaine
through the 35th ballot); id., June 7, 1884, at 1, col. 4 (both Washington delegates voted for
Blaine on all four ballots); and id., April 16, 1892, at 5, col. 2 (entire Washington delegation
committed to Blaine). Blaine did not run for President in 1888.
84. See supra notes 46-58 and accompanying text.
85. Because a verbatim record of the debates at the Washington State Constitutional Con-
vention does not exist, the State Supreme Court has used various extrinsic sources such as
contemporary newspaper reports as authority to fill the gaps in the official minutes. See Yelle
v. Bishop, 55 Wash. 2d 286, 292-94; 347 P.2d 1081, 1084-86 (1959); State v. Brunn, 22 Wash.
2d 120, 139; 154 P.2d 826, 835 (1945).
86. JOURNAL OF THE WASHINGTON STATE CONSTUTIONAL CONVENTION 1889, at 492
(B. Rosenow ed. 1962) [hereinafter JOURNAL OF THE CONVENTION].
87. Id. One newspaper described the debate as "fervid." Puget Sound Weekly Argus,
Aug. 8, 1889, at 1, col. 3. Another described it as "extended and acrimonious." Seattle Post-
Intelligencer, July 30, 1889, at 1, col. 6. Yet another reported, "The convention was unusually
quiet during the progress of the debate, and every person present was evidently impressed with
the solemnity of the subject under discussion." Tacoma Daily News, July 29, 1889, at 1, col. 4.
The three delegates proposing amendments to recognize God were all Republicans: Seattle
attorney Trusten P. Dyer, rancher Addison A. Lindsley from the Columbia Valley, and Spo-
kane Falls Judge George Turner.
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blessings of liberty and self government."88 In support of his amend-
ment, Dyer described the role of God in the state constitution in a man-
ner reminiscent of how common school advocates supported the presence
of a nonsectarian God in public schools.8 9 After characterizing constitu-
tion-making as "one of the most sacred and solemn duties that could be
performed," Dyer declared, "We are not to discuss revealed or natural
religions. From the beginning of history all peoples have had a God." He
believed in "beginning this great constitution by recognizing the Supreme
Being, whether as God, Allah or Jehovah."90
Spokane Falls Judge George Turner, who had supported Blaine at
three separate Republican National Conventions, proposed similar, albeit
more extensive, revisions to the preamble. "While I am opposed to secta-
rianism, I believe in recognizing the supremacy of God," 9 Turner de-
clared, drawing a distinction that Blaine and Blair likely would have
appreciated.92 He added that his proposal reflected "the sentiments of
999 out of 1,000 adults of the state for which we are making this consti-
tution, and the convention would simply be recreant to their trust if they
[sic] did not represent this sentiment in the preamble."93 Three other
delegates expressed similar observations regarding popular opinion on
this issue, which no delegate refuted. Indeed, Republican attorney, and
later governor, S.G. Cosgrove expressed doubt as to whether the people
would ratify a constitution that did not recognize the deity.94
Seattle Republican attorney James Z. Moore added that while he
was not a church member himself, failure to recognize a deity would set
"a bad example to the youth of a growing state." 95 In response to ques-
tioning by Republican rancher George Comegys, Moore opined that
"[a]theism goes hand in hand with nihilism and communism, and that
88. Spokane Falls Rev., July 30, 1889, at 1, cols. 4-5.
89. See supra notes 59-72 and accompanying text.
90. Spokane Falls Rev., July 30, 1889, at 1, cols. 4-5.
91. Tacoma Daily News, July 29, 1889, at 1, col. 4..
92. See supra notes 46-58.
93. Oregonian, July 30, 1889, at 1, col. 2.
94. Morning Oregonian, July 30, 1889, at 3, cols. 1-2. The other two delegates (in addi-
tion to Turner and Cosgrove) who discussed popular sentiment were James Z. Moore and
Thomas M. Reed, both Republian attorneys. Id. See also Puget Sound Weekly Argus, Aug. 8,
1889, at 1, col. 3; Spokane Falls Rev., July 30, 1889, at 1, col. 5; Tacoma Daily Ledger, July
30, 1889, at 4, col. 2; and Tacoma Daily News, July 29, 1889, at 1, col. 4. The Argus and both
Tacoma papers report Turner as saying that 99 out of 100 Washington citizens favored recog-
nizing God in the state constitution, rather than 999 out of 1,000 citizens as reported in the
Oregonian and the Spokane paper.
95. Seattle Post-Intelligencer, July 30, 1889, at 1, col. 7.
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the latter had their origin in the former."96 While stressing that he was
not referring to any particular religion, Cosgrove agreed, stating that
"[t]he man who is not accountable to some deity or other is an unsafe
man to have in the community."97 Although none of the supporters of
an amendment to the preamble endorsed a particular religion, all empha-
sized the importance of religion to society. This concern parallels the
historic common school movement, which rejected sectarian instruction
in favor of teaching about core community values, including those values
rooted in nonsectarian religious principles.9"
After the extended July 29 debate, the delegates voted to send the
preamble back to Committee for revision. Two days later, the Commit-
tee offered two options. A majority report filed by three Democratic and
two Republican delegates (including Comegys) did not refer to a deity.
Two Republican delegates filed a minority report that suggested includ-
ing a phrase expressing gratitude "to the Supreme Ruler of the Uni-
verse." After agreeing to accept one of these options without further
debate, the minority report won overwhelmingly, fifty-five to nineteen.99
In reporting this event, a Seattle newspaper noted that "the preamble
does not contain the name of God, but it makes reference to the more
generic Supreme Ruler of the Universe." 1" This comment aptly re-
flected the delegates' intention to recognize religion in general, but not
sectarianism. In the "Supreme Ruler of the Universe" the delegates had
a nonsectarian God that they believed could mingle in government affairs
without offending the separation of church and state.
96. Seattle Post-Intelligencer, July 30, 1889, at 1, col. 7. See also Seattle Times, July 29,
1889, at 1, col. 1; Tacoma Daily Ledger, July 30, 1889, at 4, col. 2. Comegys' opposition
reflected his deep personal animosity toward Christianity and traditional religion. Comeygs'
close friend and associate, Judge S.J. Chadwick, observed in the formal tribute at Comegys'
funeral: "He had no toleration for what to him was creed and dogma, yet withal he had a deep
religious nature. His impulse was to measure Christianity by the bigotry of the middle ages
.... So intense was his nature that he failed to understand that existing organizations are not
in themselves Christianity." Oakesdale Tidings, Feb. 12, 1904 (transcript available at Wash-
ington State Library). While no record exists of the delegates' religious beliefs, surveys of the
1883 and 1885 territorial legislatures reported a relatively close split between those affiliated
with traditional denominations and "Liberals", with only two members asserting "no reli-
gion." Morning Oregonian, Oct. 16, 1883, at 1, col. 7; id., Dec. 18, 1885, at 3, col. 5.
97. Morning Oregonian, July 30, 1889, at 3, cols. 1-2.
98. See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
99. Tacoma Daily News, July 31, 1889, at 1, col. 4; Morning Oregonian, Aug. 1, 1889, at
2, col. 1 (Democrats cast 12 of the 19 votes against the minority report; a Labor Party delegate
cast one opposing vote); Tacoma Daily Ledger, Aug. 1, 1889, at 4, col. 2.
100. Seattle Post-Intelligencer, Aug. 1, 1889, at 1, col. 5. See Knapp, The Origin of the
Constitution of the State of Washington, 4 WASH. HIsT. Q. 227, 269-70 (1913).
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2. God in the Declaration of Rights
On the same day that the Committee on the Preamble and Bill of
Rights reported the controversial preamble, it also reported a Declara-
tion of Rights containing thirty sections. Section 11 dealt with religious
freedom and contained both free-exercise and anti-establishment provi-
sions. '0 1 This section included the general establishment clause: "No
public money or property shall be appropriated for, or applied to, any
religious worship, exercise or instruction, or the support of any religious
establishment."'' 0 After the intense discussion during the morning ses-
sion on whether to recognize God in the preamble, section 11 passed
without debate during the afternoon session, along with the entire Decla-
ration of Rights.'03
Although the delegates did not debate the general establishment
clause, their posture toward it must be examined in light of the preamble
debate and the text of the clause itself. These two factors reflect the con-
vention's repudiation of government-backed sectarianism, and its lack of
hostility toward religion generally. Deliberations on the preamble re-
sulted in the addition of a phrase expressing gratitude to a generic
"Supreme Ruler." Similarly, the general establishment clause focused on
barring public support for "religious worship, exercise or instruction"
and other sectarian manifestations of religion.
The Committee drafted several versions of the religion clauses in the
Declaration of Rights. First, before the convention assembled, the
Northwest's leading newspaper, The Oregonian, commissioned a promi-
nent California attorney and state constitution expert, W. Lair Hill, to
draft a model constitution for Washington."° This draft, which was
published on the opening day of the convention, contained a- strict free
exercise clause guaranteeing "freedom from religion" coupled with an
establishment clause which provided that "no public money shall ever be
appropriated for the support of any religious establishment or any form
of worship; nor shall any preference be given by law to any religious
establishment or mode of worship."1 5 Republican newspaperman and
delegate Allen Weir formally submitted Hill's entire Bill of Rights draft
to the convention, excluding only the second phrase of Hill's establish-
ment clause.0 6 Hill's draft may have reflected a hostility toward reli-
101. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 11.
102. Seattle Post-Intelligencer, July 30, 1889, at 1, cols. 6-7.
103. Id.
104. Morning Oregonian, July 4, 1889, at 9, col. 3.
105. Id. The phrase "freedom from religion" appeared in Hill's written comments to his
draft constitution.
106. JOURNAL OF THE CONVENTION, supra note 86, at 500.
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gion,1 ° 7 but Weir's edited version tendered a less hostile anti-
establishment provision." °8
Departing from the Hill draft, the Committee wrote its own estab-
lishment clause. An early version proposed that "[n]o money or prop-
erty, of this state shall be given or appropriated for the benefit of any
sectarian or religious society or institution."' 0 9 The final text was very
similar to Weir's proposal, but the Committee inserted an express restric-
tion against the support of "any religious worship, exercise or instruc-
tion." With this insert, the Committee addressed the basic objective of
the Blaine Amendment: preventing state funding for parochial education
or activities. Blaine had not intended this objective to reflect a hostility
toward religion. 1 Given the debate on the preamble, neither did the
convention.
107. Comments accompanying the draft suggest this possibility. Morning Oregonian, July
4, 1889, at 9, cols. 34.
108. Morning Oregonian, July 4, 1889, at 9, col. 4. Hill's commentary discussed the his-
tory of religious freedom in the United States, and noted that "it remained for a later genera-
tion to apprehend the true principle of 'soul-liberty'-as Roger Williams named it-and to
decree an absolute divorce of the civil government from systems of religion ...." Id.
109. Seattle Post-Inteligencer, July 17, 1889, at 1, col. 3.
110. Blaine described his proposal as "fair alike to Protestant and Catholic, to Jew and
Gentile, leaving the religious faith and the conscience of every man free and unmolested." C.
BALErIER, supra note 55, at 59. Blaine and the various incarnations of his amendment were
strongly supported by many traditional Protestant religious groups. See supra notes 51, 62, 69,
70, 72 and accompanying text. The final text of the state establishment clause also closed a
potential loophole in the Hill draft by specifying that public money and property could not be
"applied to" the listed religious activities in addition to not being "appropriated for" them.
This is the precise loophole that was closed by Senate backers of the Blaine Amendment when
they amended the House-passed version in 1876. See C. MOEHLMAN, supra note 53, at 17. Cf.
4 CONG. REc. 205 (1875). Senators expressed concern that money that was not appropriated
for parochial schools might nonetheless be applied to them. 4 CONG. REc. 5561 (1876).
111. This lack of hostility is underscored by a letter from Wyatt A. George, published in
The Oregonian during the Committee's work on the Declaration of Rights. George, a
respected Washington attorney and delegate to an earlier state constitutional convention, pro-
posed adding a specific bar against state support for parochial schools to Hill's establishment
clause. George did not intend any hostility toward religion, as evidenced by this letter invok-
ing Biblical grounds to oppose any constitutional provision granting women's suffrage. Morn-
ing Oregonian, July 11, 1889, at 3, col. 3. George's letter and its possible impact is discussed in
B. Parkany, Religious Instruction in the Washington Constitution 6-7 (Aug. 18, 1965) (unpub-
lished paper available in University of Washington Law School library). Washington's first
constitution, which never became effective because the territory was not admitted to statehood
under it, did not contain elaborate safeguards against religious establishment. It simply stated:
"No person shall be compelled to attend, erect or support any place of worship, against his
consent; and no preference shall be given by law to any religious society." WASH. CONST. of
1878, art. V, § 4. Although the impact of George's letter on the state constitution is unknown,
it reflected the antisectarian, rather than antireligious, intent commonly underlying late nine-
teenth-century restrictions against state support for parochial schools.
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3. God in the Exemption from Property Tax
Delegates next faced the issue of religious establishment on August
7, 1889, when they debated constitutional limits on the property tax.
The Committee on Revenue and Taxation's majority report proposed
granting the legislature authority to exempt "actual places of religious
worship," charitable institutions, public libraries, and nonprofit ceme-
teries from state taxes." 2 Minority Democrats on the Committee offered
a counterproposal which would have exempted libraries and cemeteries,
but not churches. I" 3 The counterproposal's chief proponent, Dayton at-
torney M.M. Godman, argued that exempting churches from taxation
violated the separation of church and state." 4 Spokane Democrat and
attorney T.C. Griffitts responded that "the principle of union of church
and state was in no way here involved .... [A]ll houses of worship, all
houses used by any sect, creed or organization that worships a supreme
being should be exempt." ' Allen Weir agreed, noting that he "took no
stock whatever in the idea that exemption of church property tended to a
union of church and state.""' 6 Griffitts' and Weir's view prevailed, and
the convention delegates defeated the minority report. George Comegys,
who had earlier led the effort to omit any reference to a deity from the
preamble, proposed limiting the exemption for churches to $1,000, but
his amendment failed miserably."' After defeating a motion to create an
exemption in the constitution for all church property, the convention left
the decision to future state legislatures by a solid vote of forty-two to
twenty-three. " 18
During the course of the property tax debate, S.G. Cosgrove echoed
congressional debate over the Blaine Amendment when he accused ex-
emption opponents of anti-Catholicism. "If it were not for a certain
church organization," Cosgrove said, "very few gentlemen would want
to tax church property."' '9 If Cosgrove were correct in his assessment of
112. JOURNAL OF THE CONVENTION, supra note 86, at 655.
113. Id. at 655-56.
114. Tacoma Daily News, Aug. 7, 1889, at 1, col. 4.
115. Morning Oregonian, Aug. 8, 1889, at 2, col. 2.
116. Id. at 2, col. 3.
117. Comegys' amendment garnered only 14 votes. Morning Oregonian, Aug. 8, 1889, at
2, col. 3.
118. Tacoma Daily News, Aug. 7, 1889, at 1, col. 4; Morning Oregonian, Aug. 8, 1889, at
2, cols. 2-3; JOURNAL OF THE CONVENTION, supra note 86, at 656-57.
119. Tacoma Daily News, Aug. 7, 1889, at 1, col. 4. After describing the beneficial public
service performed by Roman Catholic nurses and hospitals, Cosgrove maintained that all reli-
gion was an effective moral force that merited tax exemption. Id. The delegate offering the
accepted version for the section, T.C. Griffitts, stressed the non-sectarian nature of his position
when he declared that "all houses used by any sect, creed or organization that worships a
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the opposition, concern over a property tax exemption for churches
rested on fear that the exemption would benefit particular sects, rather
than religion generally. The prevailing view, however, favored authoriz-
ing the common practice of assisting all religious organizations through a
property tax exemption. 120
4. God in the Public School
On August 10, 1889, the delegates again debated the separation of
church and state a final time, addressing article IX's provisions on public
education. Delegates espoused positions already familiar from earlier de-
bates on the preamble and the taxation of church property. The federal
Enabling Act required that public schools be "free from sectarian con-
trol."'2z W. Lair Hill's model constitution recast this requirement into a
provision that stated, "All schools maintained or supported wholly or in
part by the public funds shall be forever free from sectarian control or
influence."' 2 z The delegation endorsed Hill's language as a special estab-
lishment clause for public education. Hill, however, left no statement on
his intent in including this clause. His addition remains intact today.
The debates do contain some indications of the intent behind this
provision. The Committee on Education and Educational Institutions
proposed a special establishment clause for public education that was
identical to Hill's draft.2 3 The persistent, though rarely successful, ad-
vocate of strict separation, George Comegys, promptly offered an amend-
ment expressly to prohibit "religious exercise or instruction" in the
supreme being should be exempt." Griffitts also noted that he was not a church member.
Morning Oregonian, Aug. 8, 1889, at 2, col. 2.
120. Morning Oregonian, Aug. 8, 1889, at 2, cols. 1-4.
121. Enabling Act, supra note 27.
122. Morning Oregonian, July 4, 1889, at 11, col. 1. Hill's commentary on this provision
simply stated:
This section is taken from the constitution of Illinois, modified only so far as it
seems necessary to bring it into conformity to the provision on this subject in the act
of congress providing for the admission of the state.
Id. However, neither the Illinois constitution nor the Enabling Act referred to sectarian influ-
ence. The Illinois constitution simply required that the state provide "a thorough and efficient
system of free schools, whereby all children of this state may receive a good common school
education." ILL. CONST. OF 1870, art. VIII, § 1. This placed Illinois squarely within the
common school movement, which opposed sectarian, but not religious, influence in public
schools. The three other state constitutions crafted to comply with the Enabling Act reflected
varying positions on this issue. South Dakota's constitution barred sectarian influence in pub-
lic education. S.D. CoNsT. art. VIII, § 16. North Dakota's constitution prohibited only sec-
tarian control. N.D. CoNsT. art VIII, § 1. Montana's constitution did not expressly bar
either, but prohibited public schools from teaching sectarian tenets. MONT. CONST. OF 1889,
art. XI, § 9.
123. Tacoma Sunday Ledger, Aug. 11, 1889, at 4, col. 3; Sunday Oregonian, Aug. 11, 1889,
at 7, col. 4.
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public schools." 4 Comegys claimed that this amendment was needed to
purge schools of religious exercises such as prayers and Bible reading. 125
Education Committee Chairman N.G. Blalock countered that the pro-
posed ban on sectarian influence would adequately fulfill Comegy's
stated wishes without his proposed amendment. Indeed, the Committee
probably intended to block school prayer and Bible reading by its propo-
sal. The delegates had already adopted a general establishment clause
similar to the Blaine Amendment.' 26 Fearing that the Blaine Amend-
ment would bar Bible reading in public schools, federal congressional
proponents had added an exemption for such activity. 27 In crafting
their general establishment clause, which expressly barred public support
for religious instruction, Washington Constitutional Convention dele-
gates had not explicitly exempted Bible reading. 12 8 Comegys simply may
have wanted to reinforce this point or he may have wanted to ban teach-
ing about general religious principles.
Trusten Dyer also expressed fears that Comegys' amendment would
extend so far as to prohibit religious meetings at schoolhouses outside of
school hours, but Comegys assured Dyer that it would not. According
to Comegys, "'[p]ublic school' did not mean 'public school house.' "129
Despite this assurance, Comegys' amendment failed. 3 °
When the delegates rejected Comegys' language, Tacoma attorney
Theodore L. Stiles moved to tighten the provision by barring "religious"
instead of "sectarian" control or influence over public schools. 3 ' This
proposal encountered immediate resistance.' 32 Assuming that teachers
always influence their students, S.G. Cosgrove feared that Stiles' amend-
ment "might exclude any teacher from employment who had any de-
cided religious views of his own."1 33 M.M. Godman agreed and added
that he "didn't see how anything could exclude religious 'influence....
'Control' was all that the constitution could prohibit."' 34 Acknowledg-
124. Sunday Oregonian, Aug. 11, 1889, at 7, col. 4
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. See supra notes 56, 69, & 70.
128. Only a month earlier, the State constitutional convention in neighboring Idaho had
battled over just such an authorization for Bible reading in public schools, but the issue was
never formally considered by the Washington convention. Spokane Falls Rev., Aug. 1, 1889,
at 2, col. 1.
129. Sunday Oregonian, Aug. 11, 1889, at 7, col. 4.
130. Id.
131. Spokane Falls Rev., Aug. 11, 1889, at 2, col. 6; Sunday Oregonian, Aug. 11, 1889, at
7, col. 2.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
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ing a distinction between sectarian instruction and teaching about reli-
gion, Godman noted that "christianity and religion are not necessarily
identical." '135 Stiles' amendment lost, twenty to thirty-three, and James
Z. Moore's motion to delete the words "or influence" then failed without
debate. 136
These votes on the special establishment clause placed the conven-
tion squarely within the common school movement, which maintained
that public schools should present wholesome, nonsectarian religious in-
fluence by teaching about general religious principles.'37 Nearly 50,000
students attended public schools in Washington at the time of the Consti-
tutional Convention. 138 The delegates clearly intended to build the
state's educational system on this common school base.
Conclusion
The framers of the Washington State Constitution displayed a con-
sistent approach to the separation of church and state. Far from being
hostile to religion, the framers viewed religion as an important compo-
nent of a stable society. They voted overwhelmingly to express gratitude
to the deity for their liberties. 139 They authorized tax exemptions for
church property."m They declined to prohibit religious influence in pub-
lic education.' 4 In each instance, delegates spoke warmly of religion as
setting an example for youth, contributing a positive moral force to soci-
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. This view permeates the 1889 annual report of the Washington Superintendent of
Public Instruction. The territorial superintendent began this report by stressing that the public
school teacher's work is to "make citizens." 9 REPORT OF THE SUPERINTENDENT OF PUBLIC
INSTRUCTION OF THE TERRITORY OF WASHINGTON 1 (1889). In his individual report, San
Juan County superintendent E.C. Gillette observed:
[T]he gradual tone of refinement ... from decade to decade, changes the rude,
boisterous, and often profane pioneer into the grave, earnest and thoughtful citizen.
How much of this change is due to the public school, it is needless to inquire. Read-
ing begets thought, and to think is to gather the golden apples which grow in para-
dise. The public school may well be considered, therefore, not only the pillar of the
state, but the means whereby we are enabled to minister to our spiritual needs.
Id. at 100.
138. Id. at 35. The 1888 report of the territorial governor commented, "Amongst the no-
ticeable features of the landscape everywhere was the white school-house. They confront you
not only in the cities, but in the villages and hamlets and beside the country roads. The people
take pride in them and keep them in good shape." The governor added that the students
"were true Americans." REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR OF WASHINGTON TERRITORY 24
(1888).
139. See supra notes 87-99 and accompanying text.
140. See supra notes 112-120 and accompanying text.
141. See supra notes 121-138 and accompanying text.
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ety, and providing a welcome positive influence for students.142 Yet, they
were exceedingly careful to purify this state-sanctioned religion from any
taint of sectarianism. Rather than accept a reference to God in the pre-
amble, as some proposed, they hailed instead a generic Supreme Ruler of
the Universe.' 43 Public support for sectarian activities such as religious
worship, exercise, and instruction was prohibited.'" Sectarian control
and influence was forever barred from public schools.45 In distinguish-
ing between religion and sectarianism in the schools, the framers com-
ported with the fifty-year-old common school movement. 146 This result
was natural for a convention dominated by Blaine Republicans and influ-
enced by the Enabling Act's public school provisions.' 47
The history of the establishment clauses of the Washington State
Constitution does not necessarily control current interpretation. Indeed,
the evolution of religious concepts over the past century may make it
impossible for history to do so. Yet the debates among the delegates to
the Constitutional Convention provide a starting point for analyzing cur-
rent state constitutional issues on the separation of church and state.
Those delegates had sincere and thoughtful convictions about the role of
religion in society. The territorial electorate apparently favored this ap-
proach by ratifying the convention's work by a vote of 40,152 to
11,879.14 Current generations can choose to draw on the hopes and be-
liefs of Washington's pioneers in interpreting Washington's living state
constitution.
142. See supra notes 27-80 and accompanying text.
143. See supra notes 86-100 and accompanying text.
144. See supra notes 124 and accompanying text.
145. See supra notes 121-138 and accompanying text.
146. See supra notes 131-137 and accompanying text.
147. See supra notes 81-85 and accompanying text.
148. J. Fitts, The Washington Constitutional Convention of 1889, at 195 (1951) (unpub-
lished thesis available in the University of Washington library).
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